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CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY’S FORGOTTEN HOUSING LEGACY
Donovan J. Stone*
Abstract
Constance Baker Motley led the legal assault on Jim Crow and
became the first Black woman appointed to the federal bench. She spent
two decades with the NAACP’s Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
assisting Thurgood Marshall in Brown v. Board of Education. Afterward,
she desegregated the South’s public schools and universities and argued
ten cases before the Supreme Court, winning nine. Motley also
represented countless protestors jailed for their activism, including
Martin Luther King, Jr.
Despite Motley’s achievements, scholars have largely overlooked her
career. And those who have examined Motley’s work have generally
focused on her efforts to dismantle school segregation. Public school
desegregation was foundational to Motley’s LDF litigation, but her
practice also extended beyond school desegregation. Motley filed scores
of cases challenging racial discrimination in voting rights, public
accommodations, and housing access.
Using archival research, this Article explores the latter category—
Motley’s housing docket—through the lens of Stewart v. Clarke Terrace
Unit No. 1, a case she litigated in Shreveport, Louisiana. Filed in 1954,
Clarke Terrace was LDF’s first lawsuit challenging discrimination in
privately constructed but federally insured housing developments. It
sought to enforce the rights of African Americans who purchased homes
in a new subdivision only to have nearby white residents sabotage the
development. Uncovering Clarke Terrace challenges conventional
narratives pigeonholing Motley as an education attorney. It highlights her
housing advocacy and demonstrates that this work was pivotal to Motley’s
clients, even if forgotten by historians. This analysis powerfully advances
appreciation for and understanding of Motley’s civil rights legacy.

*

© 2021 Donovan J. Stone. Duke Law School, J.D. 2020; Centenary College of
Louisiana, B.A. 2017.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 1953, African Americans in Shreveport, Louisiana, received an offer
that was too good to be true. Three men—an official with the Federal Housing
Administration, a local builder, and a New York investor—approached the city’s
Negro Chamber of Commerce with plans to construct a new, low-cost housing
development for Black residents.1 Their proposed development, dubbed “Clarke
Terrace,” called for a subdivision comprised of spacious homes featuring utilities,
trolley transportation, playgrounds, and nearby churches and schools.2 Because
mortgages on the homes would be federally insured, payments would be low. Each
home could be financed for only $38 a month after an initial down payment of $330.3
The subdivision seemed a godsend. At the time, Black Shreveporters faced rank
discrimination in all aspects of their daily lives, but their housing conditions were
particularly outrageous.4 Clarke Terrace promised a solution, but it had one glaring
problem. The developers planned to build the subdivision on Jewella Road, a
primarily white area just beyond Shreveport’s southwest rim.5 Blacks worried that
white residents there would violently oppose the construction of a “Negro”
development nearby.6 At the pitch meeting, representatives of the Negro Chamber
1

Transcript of Deposition at 7–8, Stewart v. Clarke Terrace Unit No. 1, Inc., et al.
(W.D. La. July 5, 1954) (No. 4592) (on file at Library of Congress, Box 232, NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund Records, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter First Clarke Terrace Deposition]. The New York investor was likely a
representative of Dry Dock Savings Bank, which issued a proposal on March 13, 1953, to
purchase mortgages associated with the project. That proposal was never consummated. See
Stipulations at 3, Stewart v. Clarke Terrace Unit No. 1, Inc., et al. (W.D. La. July 19, 1954)
(No. 4592) (on file at Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 232).
2
Flyer, Clarke Terrace Subdivision: An F.H.A. Approved Low-Cost Home
Development (Nov. 15, 1953) (on file at Library of Congress, Box 246, NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund Records, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.). There is
some controversy regarding the correct spelling of “Clarke” in the subdivision’s name.
Contemporary accounts often used both spellings, sometimes in the same breath. See, e.g.,
Clarke Terrace to Be Developed for Whites, SHREVEPORT J., Mar. 23, 1954, at 2A. Historians
Rachel Emanuel and Alexander Tureaud, Jr. state that the subdivision was named after
Southern University president Joseph S. Clark and thus refer to the subdivision as “Clark
Terrace.” RACHEL L. EMANUEL & ALEXANDER P. TUREAUD, JR., A MORE NOBLE CAUSE:
A.P. TUREAUD AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA 220 (2011). However,
official documents from the subdivision’s developers attach an “e.” See, e.g., Flyer, supra.
This Article thus adopts that spelling—“Clarke Terrace.”
3
Flyer, supra note 2.
4
See, e.g., WILLIE BURTON, THE BLACKER THE BERRY 115–16 (2002) (explaining that
Black neighborhoods in Shreveport were concentrated in the city’s least desirable areas);
SHREVEPORT COUNCIL OF SOC. AGENCIES, THE SHREVEPORT STORY 13 (1953) (observing
that Black homes in Shreveport were almost invariably substandard structures lacking
running water or power).
5
Annexation Is Required for Housing Plan, SHREVEPORT TIMES, May 1, 1953, at A4.
6
First Clarke Terrace Deposition, supra note 1, at 9–10.
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of Commerce predicted that placing a “colored subdivision” directly “across the
street from some white people” would doubtless prove controversial.7 But the
developers assured Black leaders that there would be no issues—“they would take
care of that.”8
Shreveport’s commitment to segregation proved more intransigent than the
developers estimated. Clarke Terrace immediately drew criticism from local
churches, civic organizations, citizens, and elected officials.9 For a year, from March
1953 to March 1954, the subdivision was Shreveport’s most contentious racial issue.
White citizens constantly lobbied their government to intervene.10 Shreveport’s City
Council refused to annex the property.11 The local parish government opposed the
extension of sewerage services to the subdivision.12 Facing this opposition, the
developers compromised. They repudiated their contracts with Black buyers and
instead built a white subdivision at the site. Although the developers remained
committed to building a Black subdivision in the city, that new development would
be placed near an existing Black neighborhood.13
African Americans who had subscribed to the Clarke Terrace development
sought counsel, hoping to enforce their contracts notwithstanding white resistance.
Their lawsuit, Stewart v. Clarke Terrace Unit No. 1, has been overlooked in histories
of the Black freedom struggle.14 But contemporaries recognized the case’s
significance. Influential Black newspapers like the New York Age reported on the
case.15 Moreover, prominent NAACP lawyers litigated Clarke Terrace with the help
of local heroes. Constance Baker Motley of the NAACP’s Legal Defense and
Educational Fund (“LDF”) led the litigation under Thurgood Marshall’s supervision.
Motley visited Shreveport frequently throughout 1954 to confer with the plaintiffs,
take depositions, and direct local efforts in the case. Additionally, U. Simpson Tate,
the NAACP’s Southwest Regional Counsel, worked closely on the case.16 At the
local level, the lawyers enlisted Jesse N. Stone, Jr., whose success as the region’s
leading civil rights lawyer led some to consider him the “Thurgood Marshall of
North Louisiana.”17

7

Id. at 9.
Id.
9
Letter from Emmanuel Baptist Church to Roscoe H. White (Mar. 2, 1953) (on file at
Library of Congress, Box 246, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Records,
Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.).
10
See infra notes 155–164 and accompanying text.
11
See Annexation Is Required for Housing Plan, supra note 5.
12
See infra notes 169–171 and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes 203–206 and accompanying text.
14
Only one published work mentions the Clarke Terrace litigation. Historians Rachel
Emanuel and A.P. Tureaud, Jr. discuss the case in their biography of New Orleans–based
civil rights attorney A.P. Tureaud, Sr. See EMANUEL & TUREAUD, supra note 2, at 219–22.
15
Shreveport Ministers Blast Housing Foes, NEW YORK AGE, Jan. 23, 1954, at 17.
16
EMANUEL & TUREAUD, supra note 2, at 221.
17
BURTON, supra note 4, at 166.
8
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Drawing on archival research from the NAACP’s records in the Library of
Congress, this Article is the first to deeply analyze the Clarke Terrace litigation. It
uses Clarke Terrace as a case study to explore Constance Baker Motley’s housing
docket at LDF and the role of similar housing cases in the organization’s legal
assault on Jim Crow. As an LDF litigator, Motley was among the “architects” of the
American civil rights revolution.18 Yet, historically, she has been an unsung hero of
the civil rights movement.19 Recent years have seen increased interest in Motley’s
career—a biography and a cluster of academic articles chronicling her life have been
published since 2017.20 A second biography is forthcoming.21 Even so, little has been
said about her efforts to end housing discrimination. Most scholars continue to focus
exclusively on the school desegregation lawsuits she filed rather than examine other
parts of her civil rights practice. During Motley’s two decades at LDF, however, she
worked tirelessly to battle racial discrimination in housing in addition to public
school education.22 Indeed, her LDF colleagues recalled that her “housing docket
could have kept a small law firm busy.”23
18

Nancy MacLean, Using the Law for Social Change: Judge Constance Baker Motley,
14 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 136, 136 (2002).
19
See, e.g., Florence Wagman Roisman, An Extraordinary Woman: The Honorable
Constance Baker Motley, 49 INDIANA L. REV. 677, 677 (2016) [hereinafter Roisman, An
Extraordinary Woman] (“The Honorable Constance Baker Motley was an extraordinary
person and one of the noteworthy and surprising facts about her is how little has been written
about her life and work.”).
20
See generally GARY L. FORD, JR., CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY: ONE WOMAN’S
FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW (2017). In 2017, the Columbia
Law Review hosted a symposium honoring Constance Baker Motley and exploring her
contributions to the American education system. See Education, Equality, and the Law: A
Symposium Honoring Constance Baker Motley ‘46, COLUM. L. SCH. (April 11, 2017),
https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/education-equality-and-law-symposium-hono
ring-constance-baker-motley-46 [https://perma.cc/FMH7-DAWS]. Participants in the
symposium published several articles discussing Motley’s legacy, mostly as it related to her
desegregation litigation. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Identity Matters: The Case of
Judge Constance Baker Motley, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1691 (2017) [hereinafter Brown-Nagin,
Identity Matters]; Denny Chin & Kathy Hirata Chin, Constance Baker Motley, James
Meredith, and the University of Mississippi, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1741 (2017); George B.
Daniels & Rachel Pereira, Equal Protection as a Vehicle for Equal Access and Opportunity:
Constance Baker Motley and the Fourteenth Amendment in Education Cases, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 1779 (2017); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Equality Law Pluralism, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
1973 (2017); William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of the Next
Generation of Educational Rights Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (2017); Raymond J.
Lohier, Jr., On Judge Motley and the Second Circuit, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1803 (2017).
21
TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, CIVIL RIGHTS QUEEN: CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (forthcoming Jan. 2022).
22
See Roisman, An Extraordinary Woman, supra note 19, at 682 (noting that although
Motley was LDF’s “expert on . . . higher education cases, she handled many other issues as
well”).
23
JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 207 (1994).
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This Article will explore that disconnect, examining why Motley’s housing
cases are ignored and explaining what has been lost as a result. I argue that scholars
have forgotten Motley’s work leveling housing access because they have been
drawn to the intrigue of her school desegregation cases. Images of Motley bravely
desegregating southern schools and universities appear more dramatic than her
equally courageous acts desegregating neighborhoods and housing projects. But as
Clarke Terrace demonstrates, failing to analyze Motley’s housing docket ignores
the importance of such cases to the local communities that discrimination intimately
touched. Clarke Terrace also illustrates the tenacity with which Motley represented
her clients—even in contexts lacking the aura of school desegregation cases.
Throughout 1954, Motley trekked to Shreveport at a moment’s notice to ensure that
African Americans there enjoyed the dignity of owning a decent home,
notwithstanding threats of racial violence. Finally, deconstructing Motley’s housing
work underscores the interconnectedness of LDF’s housing and school
desegregation campaigns, as innovative strategies developed in the former context
were later adapted to the latter.
Part I of this Article contextualizes Constance Baker Motley’s housing
litigation and role in Clarke Terrace by briefly summarizing her career, focusing on
the work for which she is best known. Part II chronicles Clarke Terrace, beginning
with a short description of housing conditions in Shreveport before documenting the
underlying litigation. Part III places Clarke Terrace within the context of Motley’s
other housing cases and explores how her work equalizing housing access relates to
other aspects of her career. Part IV concludes that although Clarke Terrace and
similar cases have been forgotten, exploring Motley’s housing work will deepen
public appreciation for her legacy as a civil rights pioneer.
I. CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY
Constance Baker Motley began her career at LDF in 1945 as an intern while in
law school at Columbia University.24 The daughter of immigrants from the West
Indies, Motley recalled that joining a civil rights law firm “was the last thing [she]
had envisioned” when she enrolled at Columbia.25 Indeed, Motley’s mother
discouraged her from attending law school at all; she thought Motley should become
a hairdresser.26 But working for LDF reminded Motley that learning about civil
rights litigation had sparked her desire to study law.27 Moreover, the experience gave
Motley her “first inkling” that she would do something meaningful with her legal
education and life.28 Motley thus rejected an acquaintance’s offer to help her secure
employment with Thomas Thacher, a partner at the prominent law firm Simpson &
24

PATRICIA SULLIVAN, LIFT EVERY VOICE: THE NAACP AND THE MAKING OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 297–98 (2009).
25
CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 58 (1998) [hereinafter
MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE].
26
Id. at 41.
27
Id. at 59.
28
Id.
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Thacher.29 Instead, she would stay with LDF for two decades, rising up the ranks
from intern to research assistant, staff attorney, and principal assistant to Thurgood
Marshall in Brown v. Board of Education.30 As Motley put it, “By the time I left
[LDF] in February 1965 . . . I was one of the best known civil rights lawyers in the
country.”31
Motley joined a new generation of lawyers that LDF hired as it expanded in the
1940s. At the start of the decade, Thurgood Marshall was already a powerful figure
in the NAACP’s national office due to several Supreme Court victories he secured
in the late 1930s.32 Demand for LDF’s services surged due to his success, making it
increasingly difficult for him to litigate effectively alone.33 Marshall thus leveraged
his power in the national office to hire several young lawyers who would eventually
emerge as prominent national figures themselves, including future federal judges
Motley and Robert L. Carter.34 Marshall could not yet secure additional office space
for his growing staff, however, meaning LDF’s working conditions were inevitably
crowded. The organization’s “six-person legal staff, books, and case files were
crammed into two rooms.”35 Motley shared an office with Marshall and Annette
Peyser, LDF’s legal assistant.36 Attorneys Franklin Williams, Robert Carter, and
Marian Perry shared another.37
Although Motley’s cohort of new hires was doubtlessly impressive, she stood
out from her peers and blazed a trail destined for success. Motley had “an
extraordinary docket at LDF.”38 She traveled the South alone, desegregating housing
projects, transportation facilities, lunch counters, museums, libraries, parks, and
other public accommodations almost singlehandedly.39 Motley also represented
29

Id. As the ninth of her parent’s twelve children, Motley could not afford to attend
college or law school until a wealthy white philanthropist heard her speak at a community
center in New Haven, Connecticut. Id. at 14, 42–46. Motley so impressed the philanthropist,
Clarence Blakeslee, that he agreed to finance her undergraduate and legal education. Id. at
43–46. Upon Motley’s graduation from Columbia, Blakeslee offered to connect Motley with
Thomas Thacher. Id. at 59.
30
TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 310 (2011) [hereinafter BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO
DISSENT]; SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 297–98.
31
Constance Baker Motley, My Personal Debt to Thurgood Marshall, 101 YALE L.J.
19, 21 (1991).
32
KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
LAWYER 205–06 (2012).
33
ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE OF
EQUAL RIGHTS 58–59 (2012).
34
MACK, supra note 32, at 205–06.
35
SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 349.
36
Id.; see also CARTER, supra note 33, at 59 (noting that Peyser was a young white
woman “who worked as an assistant to the legal staff, gathering facts and data that might be
relevant to our mission”).
37
SULLIVAN, supra note 24, at 349.
38
Roisman, An Extraordinary Woman, supra note 19, at 681.
39
FORD, supra note 20, at 3.
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Martin Luther King, Jr. and other civil rights advocates, including freedom riders
and student protestors, who were jailed for their activism.40 She was best known for
desegregating public schools, colleges, and universities in the Deep South. In the
years leading up to Brown, Motley frequently conferenced with Marshall and other
LDF attorneys as they planned their strategy. She belonged to Marshall’s “inner
circle” of allies whom he trusted enough to consult in the most important Supreme
Court case of the twentieth century.41 Indeed, Motley helped draft the original
complaint in Brown and was among a group of LDF attorneys and supporters who
later celebrated with Marshall in New York when the Supreme Court issued its
historic ruling.42
But Motley recognized that despite victory in Brown, the battle to end racial
discrimination in public education had only just begun. Once the euphoria of victory
subsided, she became depressed as the gravity of the coming task registered.43 In her
words, LDF’s “staff was small, our funds meager, our plans sketchy,” and
“thousands of school districts were involved.”44 Nonetheless, Motley took it upon
herself to see that schools across the South implemented Brown’s desegregation
mandate. She “litigated hundreds of educational equality cases” in state and federal
courts across the country, including dozens in the U.S. Supreme Court.45 Unlike
some other advocates who accommodated segregationists and embraced Brown’s
gradual implementation, Motley “fiercely opposed Jim Crow with a sense of
urgency and without concern for white prerogatives.”46 In Atlanta, for example,
Motley rejected local lawyers who adopted a conciliatory approach with the city’s
school board.47 Instead, she litigated a case herself that would reach the Supreme
Court and become “one of LDF’s highest profile assaults on resistance to Brown.”48
That was not her only trip to the high court; Motley argued ten cases before that
body, winning nine.49
Motley also desegregated many of the South’s flagship universities, often
facing jeering crowds and threats of violence as she and her clients strode defiantly
across college campuses. She handled cases integrating universities in Louisiana,
40

Roisman, An Extraordinary Woman, supra note 19, at 682.
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 641 (2004).
42
See MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 103 (stating that Motley “sent a draft
complaint” for Brown to LDF-affiliated lawyers in Topeka, Kansas in 1950); id. at 106
(describing the NAACP’s celebration in New York as “bedlam”); GREENBERG, supra note
23, at 126 (explaining that Motley sent a model complaint to the Kansas lawyers).
43
Id. at 110.
44
Id.; see also Chin & Chin, supra note 20, at 1743 (“With its small office and limited
funds, implementing Brown was a major undertaking for LDF.”).
45
Daniels & Pereira, supra note 20, at 1782.
46
BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT, supra note 30, at 308.
47
Id.
48
Id. The case was Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263, 264 (1964), which is discussed
at length in BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT, supra note 30, at 307–56.
49
BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT, supra note 30, at 310.
41
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Florida, Tennessee, South Carolina, and Georgia.50 In 1955, Motley represented
Autherine Lucy in her effort to integrate the University of Alabama,51 which
produced “mob riots” on the campus.52 Motley’s most famous case involved
desegregating the University of Mississippi, colloquially known as “Ole Miss,” in
1962.53 Her client James Meredith astutely dubbed that episode “the last battle of
the Civil War.”54 Similarly, Judge John Minor Wisdom, a giant of the federal
appellate bench during the mid-twentieth century, observed on appeal that Motley
tried the case “in the eerie atmosphere of nevernever land.”55 It would take eighteen
months of litigation and a Presidential proclamation sending thousands of federal
troops to Mississippi to force Ole Miss to desegregate.56 An image of Motley
marching to oral arguments in the case alongside Meredith and activist Medgar
Evers adorns the cover of her memoir, symbolizing the importance of that moment
in her life.57
After two decades with LDF, Motley turned to politics in 1964, when New
Yorkers elected her to the state senate and the Manhattan borough presidency a year

50

Lohier, supra note 20, at 1803; MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 137
(recounting Motley’s efforts to desegregate the University of Georgia).
51
Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235, 236–37 (N.D. Ala. 1955), aff’d, 228 F.2d 619 (5th
Cir. 1955).
52
Daniels & Pereira, supra note 20, at 1783; MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 25,
at 122.
53
See Brown-Nagin, Identity Matters, supra note 20, at 1699 (noting that the Ole Miss
case was the most famous of Motley’s cases challenging the continued segregation of higher
educational institutions in the South); Lohier, supra note 20, at 1804 (“Motley’s most
memorable case as an advocate is surely Meredith v. Fair, [306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1962),]
which encompasses the series of decisions involving James Meredith’s efforts to enroll in
and integrate the University of Mississippi—‘Ole Miss.’”).
54
JAMES MEREDITH WITH WILLIAM DOYLE, A MISSION FROM GOD: A MEMOIR AND
CHALLENGE FOR AMERICA 117 (2012).
55
Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696, 701 (5th Cir. 1962). Judge Wisdom was one of four
judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit who became known as “The Four”
because they consistently ruled in favor of plaintiffs in civil rights cases. Chin & Chin, supra
note 20, at 1761. The other judges were Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle, Judge Richard Rives, and
Judge John R. Brown. As Constance Baker Motley described it: “These four men joined
forces to thwart massive resistance in the Deep South and see it meet an ignominious death
in Mississippi in 1962. They were responsible, in retrospect, for averting a North–South split
in the country like the one that had led to the Civil War.” MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra
note 25, at 134. For an account of these judges’ role in desegregating the South, see generally
JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO TRANSLATED THE SUPREME COURT’S BROWN DECISION INTO A
REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981).
56
MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 172, 183.
57
See generally id.; see also Lohier, supra note 20, at 1804 (“Suffice it to say that a
measure of the importance that Judge Motley attached to the [Meredith] case is that she
elected to grace the cover of her autobiography with the iconic photograph of herself with
Meredith on the day of her oral arguments before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.”).

2021]

CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY’S FORGOTTEN HOUSING LEGACY

1135

later.58 The move was partly motivated by Thurgood Marshall’s decision to name
Jack Greenberg, a white LDF attorney, his successor when Marshall resigned from
the organization to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.59
Motley’s career in politics would not last long, however. Her reputation as an
advocate placed her atop a shortlist of nominees to serve as a federal district judge
in the Southern District of New York.60 President Lyndon B. Johnson then
nominated her to become the first Black woman to serve as a federal judge in 1966.61
Motley was sworn in after a contentious confirmation battle in which senators
baselessly questioned whether her career as a civil rights attorney rendered her
incapable of serving impartially.62 Similar concerns twice prevented Motley from
being elevated to the Second Circuit.63 Even so, Motley became an esteemed jurist
and chief judge on the nation’s foremost federal trial court.64 Judge Raymond J.
Lohier, Jr., who currently serves on the Second Circuit, observes, for example, that
Motley was graced with “more awards and honorifics . . . than virtually any lower
federal court judge I know.”65 Moreover, it is unquestionable that Constance Baker
Motley was an “extraordinary woman” with an “extraordinary” career even before
she joined the bench.66 Her pioneering work changed the racial landscape of
America as she litigated countless cases in state and federal courts. Motley’s legacy
can thus be felt in local communities across the country, including in Shreveport,
Louisiana.
II. HOUSING LITIGATION CASE STUDY: SHREVEPORT, LA
A. Black Housing Conditions in Shreveport
Residential segregation was the norm in twentieth-century Shreveport. A 1960
study found that Shreveport was the second most segregated city in America.67
58

MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 206.
See id. at 205 (explaining that she switched careers because, among other reasons,
she “had been passed over for the top spot at LDF”).
60
Id. at 213.
61
Id. at 213–14.
62
Brown-Nagin, Identity Matters, supra note 20, at 1700–06; Lohier, supra note 20, at
1806. Despite these senators’ concerns, Judge Motley was ultimately a “judicial pragmatist”
who deferred to the “conception of a judge as a neutral arbiter of apolitical law.” BrownNagin, Identity Matters, supra note 20, at 1698. Moreover, Judge Motley’s reversal rate as a
district judge “does not materially differ from that of her colleagues” who served on the
Southern District of New York at the same time. Lohier, supra note 20, at 1810.
63
See Lohier, supra note 20, at 1806–07.
64
Id. at 1810.
65
Id.
66
Roisman, An Extraordinary Woman, supra note 19, at 681.
67
See Jeff Ueland & Barney Warf, Racialized Topographies: Altitude and Race in
Southern Cities, 96 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 50, 71 (2006) (noting that Shreveport’s “index of
59
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Another based on 1970 census data placed Shreveport atop its list of the nation’s
most segregated cities.68 Ninety percent of Shreveport’s Black residents lived in
census tracts that were themselves at least eighty-five percent Black.69 This
segregation resulted from a “long history of racial discrimination.”70 Historically,
African Americans were funneled into enclaves on the city’s western flank.71 These
neighborhoods were “concentrated in areas of rough, low and undesirable land with
bad, unpaved guttered streets and sidewalks.”72 Most Black homes were meager
“shotgun” or “row” style houses, having three rooms arranged alongside each other
such that one could “shoot a shotgun through the house without hitting a thing.”73
There were few Black homeowners. Instead, most rented seemingly
uninhabitable dwellings for a few dollars a week—all they could afford based on
their low wages. A 1953 study of Shreveport’s Black community found that only
one-third of African Americans owned their homes.74 Sixty-three percent rented,
paying between three and six dollars per week out of a weekly income ranging
between fifteen and thirty dollars.75 Of the 11,002 Black dwellings surveyed in the
1953 study, less than four thousand had flushing toilets.76 In total, sixty-two percent
of Black homes were deemed to have inadequate bathroom facilities.77 Less than
three thousand dwellings had running water and only 2,448 had bathtubs or
housing segregation” was the second highest in the nation) (citing K. TAEUBER & A.
TAEUBER, NEGROES IN CITIES: RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE
33 (1965)).
68
Chicago Ranks as the Most Segregated Northern City, JET MAGAZINE, Nov. 14,
1974, at 5; see also BILL KEITH, THE COMMISSIONER: A TRUE STORY OF DECEIT, DISHONOR,
AND DEATH 86 (2009) (“[P]rior to 1976, Shreveport was one of the most segregated cities in
the South.”).
69
Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 71 F.R.D. 623, 630
(W.D. La. 1976).
70
Ueland & Warf, supra note 67, at 71.
71
Id.; see also Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, 71 F.R.D. at 630 (observing that
“most Blacks are concentrated in five non-contiguous, identifiable, geographical areas”
located in western Shreveport); BURTON, supra note 4, at 114–28 (describing Shreveport’s
historic Black neighborhoods).
72
BURTON, supra note 4, at 115; see also SHREVEPORT COUNCIL OF SOC. AGENCIES,
supra note 4 (stating that Shreveport’s Black slum areas “are located in undesirable building
areas, being either isolated or having rough or low topography . . . . As a result, municipal
improvements such as sewer lines, paved streets and sidewalks, and street lighting are either
inadequate or non-existent.”).
73
BURTON, supra note 4, at 115; see also Blacks United for Lasting Leadership, 71
F.R.D. at 631 (“Homes in identifiable Black neighborhoods generally are of much lower
quality and value than those elsewhere in the city. Hundreds of household blocks consist of
nothing but ‘shotgun’ dwellings, typical of the architecture of Black single-family homes,
both urban and rural, in this part of the country.”).
74
SHREVEPORT COUNCIL OF SOC. AGENCIES, supra note 4.
75
BURTON, supra note 4, at 115.
76
SHREVEPORT COUNCIL OF SOC. AGENCIES, supra note 4.
77
Id.
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showers.78 Consequently, six or more families might share a single tin bathtub, each
reserving just one night per week to bathe.79
Conditions were particularly poor in the Allendale–Lakeside region,
Shreveport’s largest Black neighborhood.80 One of the city’s oldest areas, Allendale,
is named for Henry Watkins Allen, a Confederate general and Shreveport native who
served as Louisiana’s governor during the final days of the Civil War.81 Allendale
began as a racially mixed neighborhood, but it transitioned into a Black ghetto.82
Longtime residents remembered that in the 1930s, Blacks in Allendale and Lakeside
lived in the “nucleus of a cell that was surrounded by whites” of Italian, Irish, Jewish,
and Greek descent.83 By midcentury, African Americans who rented homes there
“found themselves in terrible circumstances.”84 Toilets, running water, and
electricity were rare in these overcrowded houses, and children often shared
community baths outside.85
Economic inequality, racial animus, and intentional disinvestment prevented
African Americans from escaping these dire conditions. Low wages made it
impossible for most Blacks to afford suitable housing.86 In 1952, more than half of
Black residents earned less than $50 per week.87 Roughly thirty percent worked as
domestic servants, down from forty percent in 1940.88 Only five percent held
professional or managerial roles.89 The remaining sixty percent of Black workers
were employed as clerks, farmhands, and laborers.90 White residents saw little
reason to support Black employment. In 1943, Shreveport rejected a $67,000 federal
grant for a new medical center because the city refused to comply with “a hiring
quota of twelve Blacks for every hundred workers.”91 Mayor Samuel S. Caldwell
declared that the city would not be “bribed by federal funds” into accepting “the

78

Id.
BURTON, supra note 4, at 115.
80
Id. at 114.
81
ERIC J. BROCK, SHREVEPORT 110 (2001); BURTON, supra note 4, at 116. Allen lived
in what is now the Allendale neighborhood at the intersection of what is now Allen Avenue
and Myrtle Street. BROCK, supra, at 112. Lakeside derives its name from its proximity to
Shreveport’s Cross Lake. BURTON, supra note 4, at 114.
82
See BURTON, supra note 4, at 114.
83
Id. For a description of Allendale’s early white residents, see BROCK, supra note 81,
at 110–113.
84
BURTON, supra note 4, at 115.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See SHREVEPORT COUNCIL OF SOC. AGENCIES, supra note 4, at 11 (finding that 18.8
percent of African Americans earned incomes of $10 to $20 each week; 19 percent earned
between $30 to $40; and 15.8 percent earned between $40 to $50).
88
Id. at 30.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE & DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN
LOUISIANA, 1915–1972, at 87 (1st ed. 1995).
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negro as our political or social equal.”92 The government could not “cram the negro
down our throats,” he complained.93
Inadequate financing exacerbated those problems. Recently, scholars and
popular writers have movingly explained how the federal government entrenched
segregation in the mid-twentieth century by manipulating access to mortgages.94 In
1933, the government established the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (“HOLC”),
which provided low-interest mortgages to prospective home buyers.95 To protect
itself from making “risky” loans, however, the HOLC drew color coded maps of
American cities. The safest neighborhoods for investment were colored green on
these maps, while the riskiest were red.96 Because the HOLC considered the racial
composition of neighborhoods when evaluating risk, African American
neighborhoods were almost invariably red, even when populated by middle-class
Black families.97 This practice, commonly known as “redlining,” discouraged
investment in Black communities for decades.98
Shreveport did not escape redlining. Under a 1940 HOLC map, nearly every
predominately Black neighborhood in the city was colored red for “hazardous.”99 In
one red-colored neighborhood that was eighty percent Black, HOLC appraisers
observed that white residents were “moving away as fast as they can” to avoid the
“detrimental influences” of the “negro population.”100 Only two majority African
American neighborhoods evaded the hazardous designation; both were deemed
“definitely declining” instead.101 Appraisers boasted that Shreveport’s two “green”
areas, in contrast, were both exclusively white and free from any “detrimental
influence.”102
Without federal subsidies, local banks proved unwilling to extend loans to
Black homeowners or to builders interested in constructing private homes for Black
residents.103 Accordingly, Black neighborhoods deteriorated. Shreveport’s Council
of Social Agencies thus concluded in 1953 that no “major improvements” to African
92

Id.
Id.
94
See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF
HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017); Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for
Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/
06/the-case-for-reparations/361631 [https://perma.cc/V4ES-6SQP].
95
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 94, at 63–65.
96
Id. at 64–65.
97
Id.
98
See Coates, supra note 94 (“Redlining destroyed the possibility of investment
wherever [B]lack people lived.”).
99
See generally Robert K. Nelson, LaDale Winling, Richard Marciano & Nathan
Connolly, et al., Mapping Inequality: Redlining in New Deal America, AM. PANORAMA,
https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=14/32.497/-93.789&city=shreveport-la
[https://perma.cc/748F-8B6P] (last visited July 20, 2021).
100
Id. at D3.
101
Id. at C1, C6.
102
Id. at A1 and A2.
103
BURTON, supra note 4, at 115.
93
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American housing would occur until financing was “available in amounts and under
conditions similar to that under which whites secure their home financing.”104
Lagging housing supply contrasted with surging demand. There was a “critical”
need for “more and better housing” for Black communities.105 In 1951, the
Shreveport Housing Authority opened a 270-unit public housing project called
“Elamito Terrace” in Allendale for African Americans. Within four months, roughly
1,100 families applied for residency in the low-income project; a twin project for
whites drew only 300 applicants.106 The Elamito Terrace project cost Shreveport and
the federal government $1,685,000 and consisted of twenty-six buildings, but even
it left much to be desired.107 As Shreveport historian Willie Burton observes, “[t]he
sole beauty of these apartments was in name only.”108 Moreover, Elamito Terrace
did little to alleviate Shreveport’s housing crisis among middle-income Black
families. The new project notwithstanding, nearly 1,600 African American families
likely would have been on the market for better rental properties, or potentially new
homes, if reasonable options were available.109
With space in the city scarce, some developers proposed building homes on
cheaper land beyond Shreveport’s municipal boundaries. But constructing homes in
the surrounding Caddo Parish area did not improve living conditions. Developers
discovered that by building beyond city limits, they could circumvent city
ordinances that mandated that new dwellings comply with minimum health
regulations.110 This created “an intolerable situation” for Shreveport’s Black
community.111 By building outside the city, away from municipal regulations, the
developers were “creating the new slums of tomorrow” and discouraging “local
authorities’ interest in doing something about the old Negro slum areas of yesteryear
and today.”112 As conditions worsened, African Americans grew increasingly
desperate. They were thus willing to take advantage of a new subdivision promising
modern homes at affordable prices—even if it was being constructed in an area
traditionally reserved for whites.

104

SHREVEPORT COUNCIL OF SOC. AGENCIES, supra note 4, at 13.
Id.
106
Initial Units of Local Low-Rent Housing Projects Are Completed, SHREVEPORT
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1951, at 13.
107
Id.
108
BURTON, supra note 4, at 116.
109
SHREVEPORT COUNCIL OF SOC. AGENCIES, supra note 4.
110
See BURTON, supra note 4, at 115 (noting that a 1952 ordinance required that all
new dwellings “located within the corporate limits of the City of Shreveport, as constructed,
shall have installed one water closet, one lavatory, one bathtub or shower, and one kitchen
sink, which must be connected to the city sanitary sewer or to an approved septic tank”).
111
SHREVEPORT COUNCIL OF SOC. AGENCIES, supra note 4, at 13.
112
Id.
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B. Stewart v. Clarke Terrace Unit No. 1
1. “The Home You Would Have Designed for Yourself.”
Clarke Terrace began as a handshake deal among Gerald “Jerry” S. Goodman
and builders Oscar D. Logan, George L. Johnson, Pue L. Wilson, and T. R. Felts of
the Bossier Construction Company.113 As Jerry Goodman later explained to
Constance Baker Motley, when setting out to build a project such as Clarke Terrace,
there had to be a “meeting of the minds. Men sit across a table and agree among
themselves as to what they shall do on the job, and I had my job to do, and they had
theirs.”114 The group thus agreed in February 1953 that the construction company
would build the new housing development.115 Goodman, acting as the group’s sales
agent and promoter, would market the lots.116 By November 13, 1953, Goodman and
the Bossier Construction Company had purchased more than fifty acres in Caddo
Parish to put toward their joint venture.117
Meanwhile, the developers sought the backing of local officials from the
Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”). Throughout 1953, the group met with
agency representatives in Shreveport, seeking “technical assistance” for their
planned neighborhood.118 They hoped to build the subdivision as a cooperative
housing development under section 213 of the National Housing Act, which
Congress enacted after World War II due to a nationwide shortage of affordable
housing for middle-income families.119 Under a cooperative housing plan,
developers create a nonprofit corporation that owns and operates residential
property.120 The corporation then holds the property for occupancy by members, or
“subscribers,” of the cooperative who gain title upon construction of the
development.121

113

Transcript of Deposition at 1, 8–9, Stewart v. Clarke Terrace Unit No. 1, Inc. (W.D.
La. July 8, 1954) (No. 4592) (on file at Library of Congress, Box 232, NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund Records, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter Second Clarke Terrace Deposition]; Stipulations, supra note 1, at 3.
114
Second Clarke Terrace deposition, supra note 113, at 9.
115
Id.; Stipulations, supra note 1, at 3–4.
116
Second Clarke Terrace deposition, supra note 113, at 3; Stipulations, supra note 1,
at 3.
117
Stipulations, supra note 1, at 3–4.
118
Second Clarke Terrace deposition, supra note 113, at 8.
119
National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715e (1950); Comment, Federal Assistance in
Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALE L.J. 542, 543–45 (1959);
Gerald W. Sazama, Lessons from the History of Affordable Housing Cooperatives in the
United States: A Case Study in American Affordable Housing Policy, 59 AM. J. ECON. &
SOCIO. 573, 584 (2000).
120
Julie D. Lawton, Unraveling the Legal Hybrid of Housing Cooperatives, 83 UMKC
L. REV. 117, 125 (2014).
121
Id. at 125–26. For a description of Clarke Terrace’s corporate form, see Flyer, supra
note 2.

2021]

CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY’S FORGOTTEN HOUSING LEGACY

1141

Section 213 expanded access to cooperative housing by making it easier for
borrowers to obtain financing when building cooperative developments. The section
authorized the FHA to issue blanket mortgages covering multiple properties, which
minimized the costs of securing individual loans on each lot.122 Further, certain
mortgages were eligible for FHA-subsidized insurance. To become eligible for
federal insurance, a cooperative needed to receive FHA approval of its financial
status, architectural plans, and proposed mortgage.123 Once insured, however,
cooperatives were nominally prohibited from restricting occupancy based on “race,
color or creed.”124 Finally, the Federal National Mortgage Association (“FNMA”),
a federally created corporation, supplemented section 213 by purchasing and selling
cooperative mortgages, thereby increasing the cashflow of mortgagors.125 The
system proved extremely effective for expanding housing opportunities. This was
particularly true for racial minorities, as Wallace J. Campbell, director of the
Cooperative League of the United States, explained in a 1954 Congressional
hearing. Campbell testified that in 1953, forty-five cooperative projects designed for
African Americans had secured FHA and FNMA mortgages totaling $11.1
million.126 These projects were expected to provide housing for 1,575 Black
families.127
The proposed Clarke Terrace housing cooperative would be divided into five
units, each governed by its own corporation formed to secure federal mortgages for
the property.128 On August 11, 1953, the FHA issued Statements of Eligibility to the
developers, and on September 1, 1953, the FNMA executed commitment contracts
to purchase the venture’s mortgages, clearing the way for the project to go
forward.129 By November, Goodman had begun circulating flyers promoting Clarke
122

GEN. SERV’S ADMIN., NAT’L ARCHIVES & REC’S SERV., FED. REG. DIV., U.S. GOV’T
ORG. MANUAL 1954–55 412 (1954); Comment, supra note 119, at 545 n.15.
123
Comment, supra note 119, at 555.
124
Id. at 556.
125
Id. at 558–59.
126
Housing Act of 1954: Hearing on S. 2889, S 2938, and S. 2949 Before the S. Comm.
on Banking & Currency, 83rd Cong. 961 (1954) (statement of Wallace J. Campbell, Director,
Cooperative League of the United States). The forty-five developments referenced here
included Clarke Terrace in Shreveport along with three other developments in Louisiana. Id.
at 962.
127
Id. at 961.
128
Flyer, supra note 2, at 8.
129
Stipulations, supra note 1, at 5; see also Letter from J.S. Baughman, President, Fed.
Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, to J.H. Wilson, Shreveport Negro Chamber of Com. (Oct. 7, 1953)
(on file at Library of Congress, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Records,
Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.) (confirming that FNMA had committed to
“providing for the purchase of the mortgages covering the Clarke Terrace Project”); Letter
from Albert M. Cole, Administrator, Hous. & Home Fin. Agency, to John H. Wilson,
President, Shreveport Negro Chamber of Com. (Oct. 14, 1953) (on file at Library of
Congress, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Funds Records, Manuscript Division,
Washington, D.C.) (confirming that the Clarke Terrace housing units had “been approved
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Terrace to potential African American buyers.130 The flyers invited Black families
to subscribe to one of the subdivision’s five unit-corporations by making one down
payment of $330.131 Once construction was complete, the corporations would
transfer title to the subscribers, who would then make monthly payments of $38 until
their mortgages were paid.132
Goodman emphasized that homes in Clarke Terrace, which were valued at
$5,780 each, boasted “every city convenience, including sewerage, water, gas,
electricity, telephone facilities, and hot water heaters.”133 The homes also offered
concrete streets and sidewalks, convenient trolley transportation, central heating,
and spacious lots.134 These were the “home[s] you would have designed for
yourself,” exhorted Goodman.135 If completed, these homes certainly would have
narrowed the scope of Shreveport’s Black housing crisis and produced other benefits
for African Americans. As Tomiko Brown-Nagin has explained, by moving into
comfortable homes surrounded by successful Black families, residents “gained the
pride that accompanies” living “among other African-American strivers.”136
Although these neighborhoods often remained segregated, the personal satisfaction
they produced for African Americans “cannot be gainsaid.”137 Moreover, new
housing developments also “came with bonuses” such as “badly needed shopping
centers, parks, and schools.”138 Indeed, Clarke Terrace advertised its own new
community facilities, playgrounds, and businesses along with local churches and
public schools.139
2. “Don’t You Think I Would Get Killed?”
Compelled by the necessity of new housing, Shreveport’s Black leadership
promoted Clarke Terrace despite its proximity to white residents. In early 1953, the
developers invited representatives of the Negro Chamber of Commerce (“NCC”) to
tour the proposed development site on Jewella Road.140 After giving the project its
blessing, members of the NCC encouraged other African Americans to join the
development.141 The NCC had a strong interest in supporting Clarke Terrace.
Founded in 1940, the organization sought to “foster[] and . . . promot[e] the general
for FHA mortgage insurance and that they have also been covered by a commitment of the
Federal National Mortgage Association to purchase the mortgages”).
130
See generally Flyer, supra note 2.
131
Id. at 3, 8.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 2.
134
Id. at 6–8.
135
Id. at 8.
136
BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT, supra note 30, at 74.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Flyer, supra note 2, at 10.
140
First Clarke Terrace Deposition, supra note 1, at 8–9.
141
See, e.g., id. at 11 (describing the efforts of the NCC president to recruit subscribers).

2021]

CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY’S FORGOTTEN HOUSING LEGACY

1143

welfare of [the] Negroes of Shreveport.”142 The new development surely aligned
with that goal. Additionally, a new building project might bring with it needed jobs.
Hoping to multiply the development’s economic impact for African Americans,
members of the NCC lobbied the builders to hire “negro labor” during the
construction of Clarke Terrace.143
Fittingly, the NCC’s president, John H. Wilson, was one of Clarke Terrace’s
first subscribers and strongest supporters. Wilson was an educator and entrepreneur
who earned a bachelor’s degree in Agricultural Education from Southern University
in 1939.144 He was also a World War II veteran who lived in Shreveport’s Allendale
neighborhood.145 On November 16, 1953, Wilson subscribed to Clarke Terrace Unit
No. 2, the cooperative corporation for the subdivision’s second component.146
Others followed Wilson’s lead. On November 17, Richard G. Stewart, Sr., another
World War II veteran who served multiple tours in Italy and Japan, subscribed to
Clarke Terrace Unit No. 1.147 Stewart was a Lakeside resident who served as one of
Shreveport’s first Black mail carriers.148 He subscribed after hearing about Clarke
Terrace from Wilson in the development’s early stages.149
Wilson convinced dozens of other African American families to purchase
homes in Clarke Terrace. In the development’s second unit alone, Wilson recruited
between forty and sixty percent of the roughly fifty African Americans who
subscribed for homes.150 Wilson later testified that he “was in touch with Mr.
Goodman practically every day” as he worked to fill vacancies in the subdivision.151
Likewise, Jerry Goodman testified that the project consumed his time for two
years.152 Because most African Americans worked during the day, Goodman
devoted his evenings and weekends to securing subscribers, often staying in his
office until midnight talking to potential buyers.153 “Nobody knows and appreciates
how hard I did work to put that project over,” he stated.154
White opposition to Clarke Terrace soured those efforts. As Wilson and
Goodman raced to fill lots in early 1953, white residents near the development site

142

BURTON, supra note 4, at 46.
First Clarke Terrace Deposition, supra note 1, at 10.
144
BURTON, supra note 4, at 49–50; First Clarke Terrace Deposition, supra note 1, at
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Stipulations, supra note 1, at 7.
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Id. at 6; see also Richard G. Stewart, Jr., Richard Stewart Sr.: A Father of Integrity,
Courage, and Inspiration, TEX. LAWBOOK (Aug. 1, 2018), https://texaslawbook.net/richardstewart-sr-a-father-of-integrity-courage-and-inspiration/ [https://perma.cc/K99T-72UJ].
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First Clarke Terrace Deposition, supra note 1, at 13–14.
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Id. at 14–15.
150
Id. at 11.
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Id. at 12.
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Second Clarke Terrace Deposition, supra note 113, at 44.
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Id.
154
Id. at 44–45.
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began protesting.155 By spring, the subdivision’s opponents had organized into a
powerful lobby. The first mover in these efforts was a local church. In March 1953,
Emmanuel Baptist Church, which had roughly 800 members, held a special session
addressing Clarke Terrace.156 At the meeting, the church unanimously passed a
series of resolutions opposing the project. Although the church professed its “sincere
love and respect for the colored race,” members resolved that they would “resent”
and “oppose to the uttermost any effort” to develop Clarke Terrace “into a colored
residential and business section.”157 Church members declared that building a Black
subdivision “would be an outright disrespect for our own race of white people” and
“would be detrimental to [the] church in many respects.”158
Other organizations followed suit. In the fall, members of the Floral Heights
Civic Club, a local homeowners’ association, held a “mass meeting” at Emmanuel
Baptist to “protest the proposed development of a Negro subdivision adjacent to the
Floral Heights section.”159 The club’s vice president, H.R. Lowery, spoke for the
300-member organization. Although the club did not generally oppose building new
homes for African Americans, Lowery stated that it did oppose placing “negro
homes directly across from the Floral Heights residential area for white persons.”160
In November, the Queensboro Neighborhood Community Club similarly declared
that it was “violently opposed” to the Black subdivision.161 The group complained
that the site was “located strictly within a white neighborhood.”162 Club members
passed a resolution demanding that the Shreveport mayor and city council deny
Clarke Terrace access to the city’s sewerage system and fire protection services.163
155

Id. at 20, 22.
Letter from Emmanuel Baptist Church, supra note 99. The church’s mobilization
against Clarke Terrace was ironic but not atypical. “Churches, synagogues, and their clergy
frequently led” efforts to block African Americans from entering white areas. ROTHSTEIN,
supra note 94, at 103. This often meant partnering with local neighborhood associations, as
happened in Shreveport. See, e.g., id. at 103–05 (describing examples in St. Louis,
Philadelphia, Buffalo, Los Angeles, Detroit, and Chicago).
157
Letter from Emmanuel Baptist Church, supra note 99.
158
Id.; see also EMANUEL & TUREAUD, supra note 2, at 220.
159
Meeting to Protest Negro Project Called, SHREVEPORT J., Oct. 31, 1953, at B3
[hereinafter Meeting to Protest]; see also EMANUEL & TUREAUD, supra note 2, at 220. Like
churches, homeowners’ associations were often at the forefront of opposition to residential
integration. As Jeffrey Gonda explains, such organizations “pooled community resources
and policed the standards of their neighborhoods.” JEFFREY D. GONDA, UNJUST DEEDS: THE
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 27
(2015). Gonda adds that racial exclusion was the “controlling motive” for many of these
associations. Id.
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Meeting to Protest, supra note 159, at B3.
161
Local Community Club May Enjoin Grand Jury, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Nov. 17,
1953, at 11A.
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Id.
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Id. Limiting access to sewerage services was a powerful lever employed by local
communities to bar the placement of integrated and exclusively Black developments near
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Similarly, the Werner Park–Morningside neighborhood association proposed legal
action against the project at an emergency meeting that overflowed the local
elementary school’s auditorium.164
Local officials watched as tensions escalated. In December, Caddo Parish
Sheriff J. Howell Flournoy urged members of the Floral Heights Civic Club to
remain “patient” and to avoid action “that might cause racial disturbances” in the
area.165 “If you’re going to settle the law in your own way,” Flournoy cautioned,
“then you don’t need me as sheriff or a sheriff department.”166 He added, “We have
to preserve the law and I intend to enforce the law regardless of the
consequences.”167 Earlier that month, Flournoy had written to Shreveport Mayor
Clyde E. Fant warning that going forward with Clarke Terrace risked igniting
uncontrollable violence in the area.168 Meanwhile, the Caddo Parish Police Jury
passed a resolution declaring that “the construction of a colored housing unit” near
Jewella Road would “disrupt [the] harmonious relationship between white and
colored residents of Caddo Parish.”169 The Police Jury thus urged Shreveport’s city
council to refrain from extending public utilities to the development.170 That
resolution passed by a vote of seventeen to one.171 In a later meeting, members of
the Police Jury expressed their full-throated support for segregation and
recommended that the developers repurpose Clarke Terrace as a white
subdivision.172
African Americans in Shreveport and across the nation anxiously watched as
opposition festered. On January 23, 1954, the New York Age, an influential Black
newspaper, reported that ministers in Shreveport had issued a “stinging rebuke” to
Clarke Terrace’s opponents.173 The Shreveport ministers condemned the Police Jury
members, the Emmanuel Baptist Church, and the various neighborhood associations
existing white neighborhoods. Oftentimes, a city or regional water district might charge
integrated or Black developments exorbitant rates for water usage to dissuade construction.
See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, supra note 94, at 119. Shreveport’s proposal to completely deny water
services, in contrast, was much more extreme.
164
Club Votes Opposition to Project, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Nov. 18, 1953, at 8A.
165
Flournoy Urges Patience in Housing Project Dispute, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Dec. 1,
1953, at 2A.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.; see also EMANUEL & TUREAUD, supra note 2, at 220 (observing that Sheriff
Flournoy “allegedly threatened to refuse to perform his official duty to maintain order in the
event of violence”).
169
Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Caddo Parish Police Jury, held on the 17th
Day of December, 1953, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Dec. 22, 1953, at 7B [hereinafter Minutes of
the Regular Meeting].
170
EMANUEL & TUREAUD, supra note 2, at 220; Minutes of the Regular Meeting, supra
note 169, at 7B.
171
Minutes of the Regular Meeting, supra note 169, at 7B.
172
Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Caddo Parish Police Jury, Held on the 14th
Day of January, 1954, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Dec. 22, 1954, at 9B.
173
Shreveport Ministers Blast Housing Foes, supra note 15.
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for protesting the development. Praising those who supported the project, the
ministers declared, “We here in America must unite and work together for the
preservation of our American way of life.”174 Despite the ministers’ resolve, protests
and threats of violence overcame the development. Subscriptions to Clarke Terrace
plummeted as opposition mounted. Five subscribers requested refunds from the
developers in January 1954; seven more followed in February.175 John Wilson
desperately tried to recruit replacements, but potential buyers feared an impending
“race riot.”176 Black Shreveporters pointedly asked Wilson, “Don’t you think I
would get killed?”177
These residents had good reason to be anxious. As they understood, violence
was among the “most frightening and obvious tactics” employed by whites in the
mid-twentieth century to maintain racial residential segregation.178 African
Americans who moved into white neighborhoods “faced the prospect of violent
reprisals from their neighbors and risked both their investments and their lives.”179
Indeed, the opening of a Black public housing project in a previously all-white
Detroit neighborhood had sparked a brutal race riot only a decade earlier.180
Thousands of Detroit residents “brawled in almost every corner of the city for three
days” in 1942, leaving thirty-four dead and millions of dollars in property
damages.181 John Wilson could do little to ease fears of similar violence in
Shreveport. He simply explained that Jerry Goodman had promised “that everything
would be alright, and I had to take his word for it.”182
3. “I Have Been Advised Not to Accept My Refund at this Time.”
Confronted with Clarke Terrace’s possible collapse, some courageous Black
families stood their ground and turned to litigation. In early 1954, John Wilson wrote
to the NAACP’s Southwest Regional Counsel, U. Simpson Tate, requesting

174
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Id.
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assistance.183 Other prominent Black leaders cosigned the letter, including E.A.
Bryant, President of Shreveport’s NAACP branch; E.A. Johnson, President of
Louisiana’s state NAACP conference; and John G. Lewis, Grandmaster of
Louisiana’s society of Black freemasons.184 From his office in Dallas, Tate
cautioned that the group could not file a lawsuit until the developers showed “a clear
indication” to terminate the project.185 If the developers did renege, however, Tate
argued that the group could file a challenge in federal court seeking to enforce their
original contracts.186
Tate reasoned that U.S. Supreme Court decisions invalidating racial
segregation in housing provided strong support for compelling specific performance
in Shreveport.187 As Tate explained, the Supreme Court’s first decision invalidating
state-sponsored housing segregation was Buchanan v. Warley, decided in 1917.188
In Buchanan, the Court ruled unconstitutional an ordinance in Louisville, Kentucky
that prohibited Blacks from owning homes in white neighborhoods. The Court
affirmed that decision ten years later in Harmon v. Tyler, which invalidated a similar
ordinance in New Orleans.189 More recently, Tate continued, the Supreme Court had
decided Shelley v. Kraemer, which held that the Constitution prohibited judicial
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.190 Tate conceded that those decisions
were not “on all fours” with the Clarke Terrace dispute.191 But in his view, they
nonetheless “show[ed] a disposition on the part of the Courts to be less tolerant on
the question of racial segregation in housing.”192
Recognizing the significance of the Shreveport case, Tate forwarded his letter
to LDF lawyers in the NAACP’s national office. On March 4, 1954, Constance
Baker Motley, then assistant counsel to LDF, wrote to Thurgood Marshall
confirming that she had received Tate’s letter and would be working on the case.193
183
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Perhaps no other LDF lawyer was better prepared to litigate Clarke Terrace than
Motley. A 1946 graduate of Columbia Law School, Motley was an “excellent” trial
advocate who “routinely confounded the expectations of judges and counsel.”194
What’s more, she was an expert on housing discrimination.195 In fact, while events
in Shreveport unfolded, Motley and Thurgood Marshall were also arguing another
housing discrimination case in Savannah, Georgia, alongside Atlanta’s legal
patriarch, A.T. Walden.196 These feats were made even more impressive by Motley’s
singularity in southern courtrooms. She practiced at a time when only three percent
of American lawyers were women, and less than one-half of one percent of those
women were African American.197 As Tomiko Brown-Nagin observes, those
statistics “made Motley virtually invisible within the legal profession, but all too
conspicuous in the courtroom.”198
Like Tate, Motley observed that the Clarke Terrace dispute was novel.
Although LDF had previously sued to integrate public housing units, it had never
challenged a private development backed by an FHA mortgage.199 On March 22,
Motley wrote Tate seeking more information on the case and questioning the
grounds for suing the FHA based on the prospective homeowners’ original
purchasing agreements.200 Tate’s response argued that the FHA should be joined as
a defendant in the case to prevent the agency from insuring loans on the Clarke
Terrace site for purchasers other than the Black subscribers.201 Additionally, Tate
contended that including the agency would show the extent to which the FHA was
“tacitly lending itself in support of the perpetuation of segregated housing.”202
While Tate and Motley exchanged letters, conditions in Shreveport
deteriorated. On March 23, Clarke Terrace’s developers announced they had
abandoned plans to construct a Black subdivision on Jewella Road. Instead, the site
would be developed for white residents, while an alternative Black property would
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be built on Line Avenue near the Black Cedar Grove neighborhood.203 When asked
why the developers had changed their plans, George Johnson of the Bossier
Construction Company cited only “financial difficulties.”204 No such difficulties
affected the white subdivision as it rapidly progressed. Within days, the same local
officials who had opposed extending sewerage services to Clarke Terrace approved
installing a water main on the property.205 By March 26, two homes in the
subdivision, which was rebranded as “West Morningside,” were under
construction.206
Meanwhile, Jerry Goodman refunded John Wilson and Richard Stewart’s
deposits. Goodman wrote to Wilson that he and the other developers “regret
exceedingly our inability to consummate the project, but feel there is no point in
going further in our effort.”207 Wilson responded with a single sentence: “I have been
advised not to accept my refund at this time.”208 When Stewart received his refund,
he simply jotted “Refuse to accept on advice of counsel” on the envelope and
returned it without opening Goodman’s letter.209 Stewart had previously read letters
that Goodman had sent to other African American subscribers, and he felt no need
to open his own letter before rejecting it.210
With the developers unmistakably terminating the project, the NAACP finally
intervened. In April, New Orleans–based attorney A.P. Tureaud, Sr. gave a speech
in Shreveport called “The Fight for Legal Rights,” in which he rebuked the
developers’ decision.211 Tureaud, whose name appeared on initial court filings in
Clarke Terrace, was the national NAACP’s principal lawyer in Louisiana.212 As
Constance Baker Motley later recalled, “For many years, Tureaud, a Creole, had
been virtually the only [B]lack lawyer in Louisiana handling LDF civil rights
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cases.”213 Tureaud’s speech charged that Shreveport, which had recently received
the National Civic League’s prestigious “All-America City Award,” was given the
award “in error.”214 For Tureaud, a city that yielded to pressure from segregationists
was underserving of national praise. He cautioned, however, that even the original
Clarke Terrace plans were suspect because the subdivision would not be integrated.
“We cannot fight for segregated housing,” Tureaud said.215 “We want to see housing
available equally to all people.”216 Tureaud similarly criticized the construction of
another proposed middle-class subdivision for African Americans in New Orleans
because it too would be segregated.217 Ultimately, he believed that “white and
[B]lack Americans would accept each other when the racial barriers were lifted.”218
In early May, Constance Baker Motley reported to Louisiana NAACP president
E.A. Johnson that she would arrive in Shreveport from New Orleans on May 20,
1954, after arguing an appeal before the Fifth Circuit in the University of Alabama
desegregation case.219 Motley requested to meet the plaintiffs and the president of
Shreveport’s NAACP branch upon her arrival.220 Founded in 1914, the Shreveport
branch was the organization’s oldest in the Deep South and, along with the New
Orleans branch, remained one of the “lonely outposts of NAACP activity” in the
region for many years.221 It began with emphasizing improving school conditions
and registering voters in the area, but it achieved limited success.222 Still, early
organizers in the national office remained “guardedly hopeful about the future of the
branch” and believed that a victory in a housing case there could reinvigorate local
activity.223
While in Shreveport, Motley also planned to meet the local branch’s attorney,
Jesse N. Stone, Jr.224 Stone was a north Louisiana native who graduated from the
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Southern University Law Center in 1950.225 In only four years, he had already
established himself as Shreveport’s leading Black attorney, securing victories for
Blacks in voting rights and criminal cases.226 Still, Stone had much to learn, and the
opportunity to work with an LDF leader was invaluable. Motley requested that the
younger attorney gather all written agreements between the plaintiffs and the
developers plus any other information relevant to the defendants’ liability.227 In the
coming months, Motley and her colleagues guided Stone through the filing process
as she directed the litigation from her office in New York.228
Through her regular visits, Motley became intimately familiar with
Shreveport’s Black community. She was a guest in John Wilson’s home during her
trips because Shreveport lacked hotels that accommodated African Americans.229
She dined with Black leaders and their families, growing particularly close with
Clarice Bryant, the wife of local NAACP president E.A. Bryant. After one of
Motley’s trips to Shreveport, for example, Mrs. Bryant wrote to Motley, stating, “I
enjoyed every moment that you were with me, hoping to see you soon trusting that
we will have more time to chat.”230
Richard Stewart served as Motley’s driver, escorting her around the city as she
spoke with local leaders who might bankroll a housing discrimination case.231
Historians Rachel Emanuel and A.P. Tureaud, Jr. write that while with Stewart,
225

Darrel J. Papillion, Diversity in the Legal Profession: History Part 2: Louisiana
African-American Lawyers from 1950 Forward, 53 LA. BAR J. 110, 110 (2005); RACHEL L.
EMANUEL & CARLA BALL, SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 26 (Arcadia Publishing
2018).
226
Bryce v. Byrd, 201 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1953) (enforcing the right to vote for African
Americans in Bossier Parish, Louisiana); EMANUAL & BALL, supra note 225, at 26; BURTON,
supra note 4, at 167.
227
May Letter from Motley to Johnson, supra note 219.
228
See, e.g., Letter from Constance Baker Motley to Jesse N. Stone, Jr. (May 26, 1954)
(on file at Library of Congress, Box 246, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
Records, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.); Letter from David E. Pinsky to Jesse N.
Stone, Jr. (June 21, 1954) (on file at Library of Congress, Box 246, NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund Records, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.); Letter from
Constance Baker Motley to Jesse N. Stone, Jr. (July 14, 1954) (on file at Library of Congress,
Box 246, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Records, Manuscript Division,
Washington, D.C.); see also EMANUEL & TUREAUD, supra note 2, at 220.
229
EMANUEL & TUREAUD, supra note 2, at 221. Motley was routinely rejected from
hotels and other public facilities due to her race during her trips through the Jim Crow South.
See BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT, supra note 30, at 311 (“During her travels across
the South to litigate civil rights cases, Motley personally confronted the quotidian injustices
that Jim Crow visited upon all [B]lacks. Whites barred her from hotel rooms, restaurants,
and restrooms, just as they barred local [B]lacks.”); see also MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE, supra
note 25, at 68, 73.
230
Letter from Clarice Bryant to Constance Baker Motley (June 8, 1954) (on file at
Library of Congress, Box 246, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Records,
Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.).
231
EMANUEL & TUREAUD, supra note 2, at 221.

1152

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

Motley “expressed her dismay regarding Negroes’ refusal” to discuss “racial
discrimination and mistreatment by local officials.”232 She also lamented that the
few other Black lawyers in the region refused to “cooperate with her and Stone as
they developed the housing case.”233 Motley surmised that local timidity was rooted
in fears of white backlash to civil rights agitation.234 Stewart, however, blamed Black
elites and “snitches” who cooperated with white officials in exchange for favors and
influence.235 His concerns were well-founded. The efforts of some Blacks “who had
the ear of whites” had undermined the NAACP’s earliest efforts to petition for better
schools in Shreveport, leaving the local branch “barely holding on.”236 Even so,
Motley expressed hope for Shreveport’s Black community. She was impressed by
the state of its current branch, as she explained to state NAACP president Johnson
in June 1954. Motley wrote, “It was indeed a pleasure to be invited to Shreveport,
Louisiana. I had a very enjoyable time during my stay in Shreveport, because the
branch there seems to have such fine, intelligent and energetic people connected
with it.”237
4. “The Gravamen of the Suit Is Racial Discrimination.”
With her factfinding complete, Constance Baker Motley returned to New York
to prepare for litigation. In late May, Motley sent Jesse Stone an eleven-item list of
tasks for him to complete.238 She included copies of the plaintiffs’ complaint and a
motion for preliminary injunction for Stone to file in federal court.239 Richard
Stewart and John Wilson served as the lead plaintiffs in the 100-person class action,
captioned Stewart v. Clarke Terrace Unit No. 1.240 In their complaint, they named
as defendants the Clarke Terrace cooperative corporations, Jerry Goodman,
representatives of the Bossier Construction Company, and local and national FHA
officials.241 The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment determining whether the
defendants could lawfully “deny the plaintiffs . . . the right to purchase or otherwise
acquire an interest in real property, solely because the plaintiffs are Negroes.”242
They also sought an order forcing performance of the plaintiffs’ contracts with the
232
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developers.243 Similarly, their motion for a preliminary injunction alleged that the
plaintiffs would have suffered an irreparable injury if the developers were allowed
to abandon Clarke Terrace.244
As the litigation unfurled, Motley reenlisted U. Simpson Tate. The two traveled
to Shreveport together following the NAACP’s annual conference in Dallas to take
depositions and review documents for the case.245 Arriving on July 5, the lawyers
met with Jesse Stone to depose Jerry Goodman and defend the depositions of John
Wilson and Richard Stewart.246 But it was a deposition two days later that proved
most revealing. Beginning early on July 8, the LDF lawyers carried on intense
questioning with hostile witnesses and volatile opposing counsel.247 Their deposition
of Jerry Goodman was explosive. Motley grilled Goodman on the substitute Black
development being built on Line Avenue. Local newspapers reported that, unlike
Clarke Terrace, the new development had been “zoned for Negro use.”248 Motley
asked Goodman to explain whether Shreveport actually zoned neighborhoods by
race, which would have been unconstitutional under Supreme Court precedent.249
Goodman replied that city ordinances indeed designated certain areas as being
appropriate for building Black homes.250 Although he later backpedaled, stating that
he was unsure whether those ordinances remained on the books, Goodman was
certain that there were specific areas where developers could “build a project for
negroes.”251
Goodman’s attorney intervened at this point, objecting to Motley’s questions
about Line Avenue and zoning as “having no bearing whatever on any issue in the
case.”252 The attorney, John R. Pleasant, warned that if Motley continued her line of
questioning, he would take the issue to a judge.253 Likewise, FHA attorney Mason
Gilfoil complained that racial questioning was “totally irrelevant and immaterial” to
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the case.254 Gilfoil asserted that he would discontinue the deposition and throw out
the testimony on the ground that it was a “complete waste” of his time.255 U. Simpson
Tate interjected, exclaiming that the “gravamen of the suit is racial discrimination”
and that anything tending to prove such discrimination was therefore relevant.256
Gilfoil responded that the “gravamen of the suit might be racial,” but racial issues
were limited to the development at “Clarke Terrace on Jewella Road and nowhere
else.”257
Motley and Tate conceded the point, but Tate continued pressing Goodman on
the Clarke Terrace development. Taking the reins from Motley, he interrogated
Goodman over the circumstances leading to the project’s demise, focusing
particularly on the role of white opposition. Goodman testified that he first became
aware of white protests, specifically from members of the Emmanuel Baptist
Church, in late 1953.258 That opposition allegedly led to a closed meeting in 1954 in
which the mayor, sheriff, city council, police jury, and local FHA representatives
met to discuss whether the project should continue.259 At the meeting, mayor Clyde
Fant announced that he had received threats regarding the Clarke Terrace
development.260 Later testimony alleged that the sheriff, mayor, and members of
both the city council and police jury all voiced their opposition to Clarke Terrace
during the meeting.261 The leaders then negotiated a compromise in which Clarke
Terrace would be moved to a nonwhite area of Shreveport while the original site
would be reserved for whites.262
Goodman denied this account. He testified that Clarke Terrace failed simply
due to lack of interest. According to Goodman, the developers originally planned to
build roughly 250 homes in the subdivision. However, when sales plummeted in late
1953, the group determined that the project was no longer feasible.263 Goodman
failed to recall any discussions of possible racial motivations underlying the group’s
decision.264 As he saw it, they simply “could not get the sales.”265 But when asked
about the alternative Line Avenue project, which would also include 250 homes,
254
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Goodman was curiously confident that the new development would succeed.266
Although Goodman again denied that racial animus affected each project’s viability,
the undertone was clear.267 Notwithstanding demand among African Americans for
new homes, Clarke Terrace failed due to white intimidation while the Line Avenue
development flourished in a section informally zoned for Blacks.
Motley and Tate next deposed Harry F. Allen, Shreveport’s local FHA
director.268 Allen, who had been with the FHA for over a decade, described his
office’s involvement with Clarke Terrace and the nature of section 213 cooperatives.
The director testified that in 1953, he attended several meetings regarding Clarke
Terrace with the project’s developers, potential financers, and representatives of the
Black community.269 Motley asked Allen whether, through those meetings, he
learned that Clarke Terrace would be an exclusively Black development.270 Allen
denied that his office considered whether there was any “differentiation between
negroes or otherwise,” but he explained that it was his “general impression that it
was being developed for negroes.”271 This was contrary to the requirements of
section 213, which Allen conceded prevented “any segregation on the basis of race,
color or creed to exist on any” FHA-insured property.272
Allen reconciled this incongruity by explaining that although the FHA could
not insure properties that were explicitly segregated, it lacked the authority to decide
to whom builders could sell.273 He added that the agency had never approved
mortgage insurance for Clarke Terrace.274 Instead, Shreveport’s FHA office had
simply issued the development a statement of eligibility, which involved only
approving its architectural plans, construction materials, and the contents of its
marketing brochures.275 Motley seized upon the latter point. As she pointed out, the
front cover of the Clarke Terrace brochures advertised “An FHA Approved Low
Cost Home Development.”276 The same words—“FHA Approved”—were stamped
on the second page as well.277 Indeed, six pages of the brochure were marked “FHA
Approved.”278 In other words, observed Motley, the materials given to potential
subscribers clearly indicated that Clarke Terrace had received FHA approval: “There
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could be no mistake about it to anyone who could read English, is that correct?” she
asked. “I don’t think so,” answered Allen.279
As discovery concluded, the NAACP team prepared for pretrial litigation. On
July 8, 1954, lawyers for the defendants filed three motions asking the federal court
to either dismiss the lawsuit or enter a summary judgment in their favor.280 As an
initial matter, the defendants contended that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case because state contract law, not federal law, governed the issues it
presented.281 Second, they argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief
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proposed the Clarke Terrace bait-and-switch. In the spring of 1954, the Shreveport FHA
director allegedly “suggested and then consented to the transfer of the Statements of
Eligibility regarding the proposed Clarke Terrace Housing Development on the Jewella Road
site” to Line Avenue. Plaintiffs’ Answers to Defendants’ Interrogatories, supra note 259, at
2. He did so “without the consent or approval” of the plaintiffs. Id. Moreover, Allen attended
the closed meeting during which Shreveport’s political leaders brokered the compromise
with the developers. Id. at 3. These allegations indicate that Allen was not simply a
disinterested agency official. Rather, he was deeply imbedded in a local establishment intent
on segregating communities under the guise of preserving racial harmony. Cf. SULLIVAN,
supra note 24, at 388 (observing that “[t]he deference of federal agencies to local autonomy
made it extremely difficult to gain traction” in the fight against segregated housing, which
“the NAACP named as a defining challenge in the postwar era”).
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because the FHA had not definitively approved the project.282 Finally, they argued
that even if the federal court had jurisdiction and a valid contract existed, the
defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the merits.283 With the lawsuit’s
future at risk, Constance Baker Motley wrote to Jesse Stone that she would return to
Shreveport again on July 17 in advance of a hearing on the motions.284
Motley and Stone argued the motions in Shreveport before U.S. District Judge
Benjamin Dawkins. Judge Dawkins, who was born in 1911 in Monroe, Louisiana,
was himself the son of a federal judge and former Associate Justice of the Louisiana
Supreme Court.285 He was also one of the most “ardent segregationists” on the
federal bench in the mid-twentieth century.286 But Dawkins also had a softer side.
The Justice Department lawyers who litigated civil rights actions before him in the
following decades would describe Dawkins as a “segregationist who could be
trained.”287 He was “highly sensitive to the injustices and gross inequalities”
presented to him despite his troubling views on race.288 Justice Department lawyers
thus dubbed Dawkins one of their “most promising pupils.”289 Dawkins had not yet
achieved enlightenment in 1954, however. He was thus surely a judge that Black
litigants would have hoped to avoid, and Motley, Stone, and the plaintiffs were
placed squarely in front of the conservative jurist.
Dawkins ruled as expected. Despite the lawyers’ persistence, the judge
dismissed the lawsuit on December 29, 1954.290 Accepting the defendants’
arguments, Dawkins held that the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the case and
that, even assuming federal jurisdiction applied, the court lacked authority to compel
specific performance of the plaintiffs’ contracts.291 “Injunctions do not lie against
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Letter from Elwood H. Chisolm to J.H. Wilson, President, Shreveport Negro
Chamber of Comm. (Jan. 25, 1955) (on file at Library of Congress, Box 246, NAACP Legal
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supra note 290.
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alleged conspiracies,” wrote the judge.292 Dawkins advised that the plaintiffs could
file a new lawsuit seeking monetary damages, which the court had authority to
issue.293 But he cautioned that it was “very doubtful . . . that the officials named as
proposed defendants could be held liable.”294
Motley remained hopeful. Taking Judge Dawkins at his word, she proposed
suing multiple officials “for their tortious interference with an advantageous
contractual relationship.”295 To help her overcome Dawkins’ doubts, she circulated
a memorandum on Clarke Terrace to the NAACP’s leading housing lawyers across
the country, including Los Angeles’ Loren Miller and Chicago’s William R.
Ming.296 Miller’s insight would have been particularly useful, as he was recognized
as one of the nation’s foremost experts on housing discrimination.297 Likewise, Ming
was a Black law professor at the University of Chicago and a civil rights attorney
who had previously counseled Thurgood Marshall in the restrictive covenant
cases.298 Notwithstanding these efforts, however, the NAACP never filed a second
lawsuit. Interest in Clarke Terrace dissipated after the case was dismissed, making
it difficult for Motley to proceed. Even so, Clarke Terrace represented a courageous,
albeit unsuccessful, attempt to challenge discrimination in Shreveport despite threats
that violence and other “racial disturbances” would ensue if the project continued.299
III. DISCOVERING MOTLEY’S HOUSING LEGACY
Constance Baker Motley’s involvement in Clarke Terrace reflected both her
and the NAACP’s increasing focus on housing inequality at midcentury. Buoyed by
a successful campaign against racially restrictive covenants, LDF’s housing
discrimination docket surged in the 1950s.300 Advocates hoped the covenant victory
292
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would invigorate efforts in local communities to “protest exclusionary policies in
courts of law.”301 In 1953, the NAACP passed a resolution declaring that “residential
segregation and restriction of racial minorities are at the core of the whole racial
segregation issue in all phases of American life.”302 “No federal subsidies, funds,
credits or powers,” it added, “should be used to aid any housing, whether public or
private, unless there is an assurance against any type of racial or religious
discrimination or segregation in such housing.”303 The association thus adopted as
its “prime goal” the “eradication of every vestige of racial segregation or racial
restriction in housing that receives any form of public aid or support.”304
Motley often spearheaded litigation aimed at furthering that goal. Indeed, while
she argued Clarke Terrace in Shreveport, Motley also juggled at least four other
housing lawsuits in Pennsylvania, Georgia, Alabama, and Michigan.305 At other
times, she argued housing cases in Missouri, New Jersey, and Ohio, among others.306
Motley thus became LDF’s “resident expert on housing matters,” writes historian
Richard Kluger.307 “She was a plodder, but she knew her stuff,” recalled a
colleague.308 In fellow LDF attorney Jack Greenberg’s words, her “housing docket
could have kept a small law firm busy.”309 Motley’s “most ambitious effort,”
Greenberg observed, involved litigating against the Levittown, Pennsylvania,
development, which consisted of 16,000 homes built exclusively for middle-class
white Americans.310
Yet despite the centrality of housing cases to Motley’s early practice, this part
of her career has consistently gone unnoticed. In most descriptions of her work,
Motley’s housing cases—if discussed at all—are merely an afterthought, mentioned
briefly before addressing her blockbuster school desegregation lawsuits.311 Indeed,
this is true even in Motley’s account of her own life. “In her memoir, Judge Motley
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does not discuss housing cases at all,” writes one commentator.312 A recent
biography about Motley likewise fails to mention her housing docket at LDF, instead
focusing most of its discussion of Motley’s LDF litigation on her work
implementing Brown.313 In other words, Constance Baker Motley is often treated as
though she were single-mindedly focused on eradicating educational discrimination,
which ignores other facets of her illustrious career.314
Even Shreveport forgot about Motley’s housing case there. When President
Lyndon B. Johnson nominated Motley to become the first Black woman to serve as
a federal judge in 1966, the Shreveport Times published an article entitled
“Constance Baker Motley: Negro Woman Selected for Federal Judgeship.”315
Although Motley tackled one of the most racially divisive issues facing Shreveport
in the preceding decade, the Times made no mention of Clarke Terrace. The paper
observed only that “Mrs. Motley is an attorney who has handled civil rights matters.
From 1945 to 1965 she rose from a research student to associate counsel of the Legal
Defense & Education[al] Fund of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People.”316 Thus, Clarke Terrace, like most of Motley’s housing work,
escaped the historical record even in the city where it was most relevant.
Why have Motley’s housing cases been neglected, and what has been lost as a
result? The pages that follow answer those questions, starting with the first. Put
simply, Motley’s housing discrimination cases are forgotten because they are
eclipsed by Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny.317 As a recent law school
graduate in 1946, Motley began her career at LDF during a turning point in the
organization’s history. During the 1940s, LDF launched a broad-based attack on Jim
312
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Crow with a particular focus on expanding access to housing for African
Americans.318 That effort culminated in 1948 with victory in Shelley v. Kramer,
which ruled judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants
unconstitutional.319 Shelley was the product of a decades-long campaign to
invalidate restrictive covenants and other practices that crammed Blacks into
segregated ghettos.320 Motley remarked that Shelley “cemented a belief among” civil
rights lawyers “that the Supreme Court was becoming more receptive to the idea”
of using the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the rights of African Americans.321
In the 1950s, LDF attorneys capitalized on the Court’s increasing racial
liberalness by redoubling their efforts to attack racial segregation in schools and
universities. LDF began the decade by winning McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, which ruled unconstitutional the segregation of state-funded graduate and
professional schools.322 Then came victory in Sweatt v. Painter, which held that
racially separate law schools could never equal each other.323 In response to
McLaurin and Sweatt, LDF convened a strategy conference in June 1950 in which
it embraced total desegregation as the primary goal of its public-school litigation
campaign.324 That decision ended LDF’s practice of suing to equalize segregated
schools under Plessy v. Ferguson’s separate but equal doctrine, setting in motion the
organization’s monumental school desegregation campaign.325
Most accounts of Constance Baker Motley’s career begin—and often end—
here, with her efforts to secure and enforce Brown’s desegregation mandate.326 So
too do many descriptions of LDF’s litigation in general, often bypassing the
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organization’s work in other contexts.327 However, the “attack on school segregation
was only part of a much broader effort” to end racial discrimination, and the NAACP
“was never committed to destroying school segregation because it was central to the
system of racial subordination.”328 Instead, “school segregation was just one of many
targets.”329 The organization settled on school desegregation as a focal point of its
strategy only after accumulating favorable precedents in school cases, almost
haphazardly.330 But that does not discount the importance of the NAACP’s housing
discrimination work, as efforts to remedy housing inequality were among the
organization’s top priorities from its founding onward.331 Indeed, one of the
NAACP’s earliest Supreme Court victories was Buchanan v. Warley, which
outlawed ordinances mandating residential racial segregation.332 Moreover, housing
discrimination, residential segregation, and educational inequality were and remain
closely intertwined.333
Exclusive focus on Brown, though understandable given the decision’s import,
has precluded scholars from examining these and other aspects of Motley’s career
327
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and LDF’s contributions to the civil rights movement. In her memoir, for example,
Motley devotes three chapters to vividly describing the years preceding and
following Brown.334 Important and concurrently transpiring events in Motley’s
housing work, on the other hand, receive no mention. For example, only three days
after the Supreme Court decided Brown, Motley and Thurgood Marshall filed
Heyward v. Public Housing Authority through Atlanta-based attorney A.T.
Walden.335 Heyward sought to integrate public housing projects in Savannah,
Georgia.336
Meanwhile, Motley had already been involved with Clarke Terrace for several
months. She made her first trip to Shreveport on May 20, 1954—only four days after
Brown was announced.337 Similarly, Motley describes attending the NAACP’s July
1954 annual convention in Dallas, Texas, two months after Brown. She writes that
the atmosphere there was “euphoric” as advocates from around the country gathered
to “savor victory.”338 “[T]he pivotal battle, it was felt by all, had been won.”339 There
remained other battles to be fought, however, and Motley traveled to Shreveport
again immediately following the Dallas convention, this time with U. Simpson Tate,
to conduct depositions in Clarke Terrace.340 These simultaneously occurring events
in Clarke Terrace and Heyward were understandably omitted while Motley
recounted experiencing the most important Supreme Court decision of the twentieth
century.341 But what is lost by failing to examine these and other cases that Brown
overshadowed?
Discovering Motley’s housing work provides scholars with a richer
understanding of her groundbreaking career. Motley’s work tackling residential
segregation and housing discrimination provided her with crucial learning
experiences that shaped the trajectory of her civil rights practice. During her earliest
days at LDF, Motley watched as the organization successfully litigated against
334
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restrictive covenants in Shelley. As an LDF intern while in law school, Motley
attended several strategic planning meetings organized by Thurgood Marshall
between 1945 and 1947 that proved essential to the Shelley campaign.342 Marshall
assembled the nation’s leading housing experts to address what he called “the
foremost problem confronting Negroes today.”343
These conferences produced a strategy that became an LDF trademark and was
later used to achieve victory in Brown.344 For the first time, LDF would utilize
innovative social science research to undermine segregation, focusing on the costs
of limiting Black families to urban ghettos.345 When the Supreme Court proved
receptive to such arguments, LDF adapted the tactic to the “parallel fight against
educational inequalities in the South.”346 For her part, Motley observed that the
conferences “were a prototype for the school desegregation cases to come.”347 She
recalled that the arguments advanced in Shelley were “so sophisticated and new, it
required unusually skillful legal thinkers and analysts.”348 Listening to eminent
advocates like Marshall, Charles Hamilton Houston, Loren Miller, William Ming,
and others “debate and develop the new theory,” Motley wrote, “provided me with
an amazing legal education.”349
Motley put that education to work, diving headfirst into a multitude of
challenging housing-related issues. In 1953, she wrote a twenty-page memorandum
on “Racial discrimination in housing,” which she circulated to advocates attending
the NAACP’s annual conference in New York.350 Motley advised her colleagues to
focus on the “total housing picture” when considering the “problem of racial
discrimination in housing” and identified three areas where housing discrimination
warranted NAACP attention—public housing, publicly aided housing, and private
housing.351 Based on those categories, she described the biggest problems facing
housing advocates, proposed solutions, and summarized previous and pending cases
challenging discriminatory policies.
342
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The second category in Motley’s memorandum, discrimination in publicly
aided housing, was one of the newest and most urgent problems facing the
NAACP.352 In her section of the memorandum addressing publicly aided housing,
Motley asked, “How are we to challenge the practices of large scale builders and
developers who construct the Levittowns . . . and similar F.H.A. insured
developments which are kept lily-white through selling and leasing policies?”353
Motley recognized that there was nearly a “complete absence of decided cases
involving racial discrimination” in such developments because the federal
government had only recently begun providing public aid to housing developers.354
Indeed, Motley identified only one case considering the issue, Dorsey v. Stuyvesant
Town Corporation,355 which the New York Court of Appeals decided in 1949. The
Dorsey court rebuffed an LDF-led effort to secure a ruling that nominally private
entities that received tax exemptions and other benefits were agents of the state for
constitutional purposes.356 Even so, Motley advised that the issue could be “raised
again” in other cases and that the Dorsey strategy remained the most effective
method of attacking publicly aided housing.357 The task would be to prove that
benefits such as FHA mortgage insurance were so transformative that developers
should be held to the “same constitutional restrictions as would be imposed upon a
federal housing development.”358
Motley rose to the challenge. In the early 1950s, after LDF unsuccessfully
sought to force the desegregation of all federal public housing projects, she filed
lawsuits across the country challenging all forms of housing discrimination.359 Her
efforts ultimately established the “foundations” for the modern civil rights regime,
even before Congress enacted federal antidiscrimination legislation like the Fair
Housing Act of 1968.360 Motley’s boldest challenge was Johnson v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc., an action to desegregate the infamous Levittown development in Bucks
County, Pennsylvania, which she also referenced in her memorandum.361 Private
real estate developer William Levitt planned to construct a massive community
featuring thousands of single-family homes in the Philadelphia suburb.362 Levitt
352
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refused to sell to nonwhite homebuyers, citing white residents’ preferences to live
in segregated neighborhoods.363 Levittown made international headlines when
residents violently confronted the few African Americans who managed to buy
homes in the development.364 When the first Black family moved into Levittown,
roughly 600 white residents protested outside their home, pelting the family with
rocks.365 They demonstrated for two months, burning crosses outside the home and
even renting a unit adjacent to the Black family from which they flew Confederate
flags and blasted music incessantly.366 The protests did not stop until the
Pennsylvania attorney general intervened.367 Levittown thus became “synonymous
with white intransigence and opposition to interracial neighborhoods.”368
Adopting the Dorsey approach, Motley and Thurgood Marshall argued in
federal court that Levitt’s corporation and the federal government were so
intermingled that the former was subject to the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause.369 The FHA and the federal Veterans Administration had enabled
Levittown by insuring mortgages on properties there and providing other benefits.370
But the court rejected Motley and Marshall’s innovative argument, ruling that
Levitt’s corporation did not suddenly transform into a state actor when it accepted
federal benefits.371 Accordingly, constitutional prohibitions on racial discrimination
did not bind the corporation. Johnson thus “backfired,” affirming that the
“Constitution had little application in the private housing market.”372 Still, Motley
had bravely attempted to enforce the rights of Black homeowners and slow
segregation’s march northward.
The Levittown litigation was an extension of Motley’s work in Clarke Terrace.
Although Johnson was doubtlessly the most aggressive challenge to constructing
federally backed housing developments, it was not the first. Nor was Dorsey, which
considered the entanglement of a private developer and the New York state
government. Instead, Clarke Terrace held that honor. As Motley explained to
Marshall while they contemplated whether to take on Clarke Terrace, LDF had “not
as yet brought any case . . . for the admission of Negroes” to a private project with
federally insured mortgages in 1954.373 Clarke Terrace was thus the first of two
cases filed that year challenging, “for the first time, the legality of discrimination in
FHA insured housing,” reported the NAIRO in its annual review.374 Motley surely
363
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would have drawn on her experience in Clarke Terrace as she litigated Johnson just
one year later. Clarke Terrace thus likely functioned as a test case used to explore
the efficacy of Dorsey’s strategy against federally backed developments before
filing more ambitious challenges in other jurisdictions. And although courts
dismissed both Clarke Terrace and Johnson, Motley continued filing cutting-edge
legal challenges to discriminatory housing policies across the country, following the
blueprint she established in her 1953 memorandum.375
In addition to deepening scholars’ understanding of her career, unpacking
Motley’s housing work provides another opportunity for the public to appreciate her
contributions to American society. Although cases like Clarke Terrace, Heyward,
and Johnson have escaped attention, Constance Baker Motley is herself well known
among civil rights scholars and advocates.376 But Motley has failed to garner similar
recognition among the public despite her extraordinary work at LDF.377 Instead, like
other women of the era, traditional narratives of the civil rights movement
marginalized Motley, focusing on her male LDF colleagues like Thurgood Marshall,
Robert Carter, and Jack Greenberg.378 Indeed, one of her biographers writes that
Motley “was relegated to the background while the well-known men in the
narratives were placed in the spotlight.”379 Any effort to increase awareness of
Motley’s career thus “expands the view of history from the model of leadership by
charismatic men to a more complete model” that includes women leaders.380
This is critical because Motley was often assigned LDF’s most dangerous cases
in the South precisely because she was a woman. In her words, she was a victim of
Thurgood Marshall’s “joking theory . . . that [B]lack women were less subject to
attack in the South than [B]lack men, ‘since all white men had [B]lack

375
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Mammies.’”381 That contention was certainly false—the threat of violence often
loomed over Motley during her many trips South.382 During one of her trips to
Alabama, Motley was guarded by “six or eight [B]lack men with shotguns and
machine guns” because the home she was visiting had been bombed several times
before.383 That experience “sent shivers up my spine,” she later remembered.384
Documenting Motley’s housing cases thus helps to reframe conventional
understandings of women like Motley, who risked their lives to challenge injustice
while navigating an often sexist and always patriarchal movement.
Finally, and most importantly, studying Motley’s housing work highlights the
issue’s importance among the Black families whose lives housing discrimination
intimately affected. In Shreveport, African Americans remained relegated to
decaying neighborhoods following Clarke Terrace’s dismissal. For example, even
in 1978, Shreveport’s Allendale neighborhood, where plaintiff John Wilson resided,
remained overwhelming Black and comprised of renters rather than homeowners.385
African Americans constituted ninety-nine percent of Allendale residents, and 3,416
of the neighborhood’s 5,600 dwellings were rental properties.386 Rents averaged just
$48 per month.387 And even today, Shreveport’s larger Black community remains
walled off from their white neighbors to the east.388 Of course, it is impossible to
know what difference the Clarke Terrace subdivision would have produced had
Clarke Terrace been successful.389 But the decades that followed its dismissal at
least prove that the bar was low.
381
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Housing discrimination in Shreveport was personal for the Clarke Terrace
plaintiffs, who risked their lives and livelihoods by challenging racism in the Deep
South.390 Richard Stewart’s family was “devastated when the lawsuit was
dismissed.”391 One of his sons writes that Stewart “looked forward to raising a family
and availing himself of the benefits he had earned during his military service.”392
Moreover, acquiring a home would have helped ensure that his children “had an
opportunity to receive college educations.”393 Richard Stewart’s children eventually
had illustrious careers befitting the offspring of a civil rights hero despite losing their
home in Clarke Terrace. His three sons, Carl, James, and Richard, Jr., have served
as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Caddo
Parish District Attorney, and United States Navy Captain, respectively.394 But the
importance that Stewart placed on securing housing was typical of a generation of
twentieth-century African Americans strivers who dreamed of raising their families
in decent homes.
That group included Constance Baker Motley. Despite being an advocate for
housing equality, Motley spent years living in a functionally segregated housing
complex in New York City.395 She rented a unit in the Riverton House development
in Harlem, which the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company built after groups
protested its racist policies in other projects.396 Met Life had previously constructed
the whites-only Stuyvesant Town development in East Manhattan, which was the
target of the Dorsey litigation Motley chronicled in her 1953 memorandum.397
Robert Carter, Motley’s LDF colleague and Riverton House neighbor, recalled that
Met Life seemingly practiced “blatant discrimination and sponsor[ed] racial
segregation with impunity.”398 But even as Carter and Motley were “completely
engaged body and soul in an all-out effort to eliminate racial discrimination,” Carter
never questioned renting from Met Life, “a racist landholder.”399 “Decent affordable
housing was a dire immediate need,” he explained, and for urban African Americans,
that need could only be met “within the strictures of segregation—one could reject
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either the segregation or the housing.”400 Many Black families agreed, as more than
fifty thousand New Yorkers applied to live in Riverton House’s twelve hundred units
when the complex opened.401
Motley similarly understood that compromising on housing came with a toll,
as Black families living in segregated housing found no respite from their purported
inferiority, even at home. Motley channeled that feeling into her brief political
career. While a New York state senator, and later as Manhattan borough president,
she “devoted considerable time and energy” to promoting equal access to housing.402
She championed affordable housing for impoverished New Yorkers, many being
people of color, and supported redevelopment projects in Harlem and other urban
ghettos that promised “better and new housing stock in areas with extraordinary
need.”403 Motley’s political emphasis on housing equality links her housing-focused
LDF litigation to her later efforts to remedy discrimination using other forms of
advocacy, revealing a through line in her career.404 It also illustrates the personal
connection between Motley’s lived experiences and the legal causes she
championed, as Motley was eager to escape, in her words, the “psychological stigma
that every ghettoized person endures.”405
IV. CONCLUSION
Commemorating Judge Constance Baker Motley’s death in 2005, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg wrote that it was her “great good fortune to be among the legions
whose lives Judge Motley touched.”406 Motley taught the late Justice that “law and
courts could become positive forces in achieving our nation’s high aspiration—as
carved above the entrance to the U.S. Supreme Court—Equal Justice under Law.”407
Ginsburg hoped that Motley’s legacy would inspire young lawyers and that her
achievements would “stand as basic building blocks for the work that remains to be
done.”408
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Historians have only recently begun documenting Motley’s foundational
contributions to American society and law. The challenge is to record Motley’s
career in ways that invigorate passion and dialogue while remaining true to the
totality of her work as a lawyer and judge. Until now, scholars have focused on
Motley’s efforts litigating Brown v. Board of Education and later desegregating the
South’s public schools and universities. Her contributions in that arena cannot be
overstated. Brown was the landmark constitutional event of the twentieth century,
and Motley’s efforts to enforce the decision opened the doors of higher education to
millions of African Americans in the South. Motley is rightly celebrated for her role
defeating Jim Crow in this context.
But despite the singularity of Brown and its progeny, myopic focus on Motley’s
school desegregation litigation disserves her career and legacy. To truly understand
Motley’s life, scholars must broaden their perspectives beyond schools and
universities. This Article thus focused on Motley’s housing docket at LDF,
exploring Stewart v. Clarke Terrace Unit No. 1 as an example. That analysis
highlights the passion Motley brought to all of her cases and demonstrates that
Motley’s clients found her housing work essential, even if historians traditionally
have not. But like school desegregation cases, the housing litigation chronicled here
represents only a fragment of Motley’s civil rights practice. Future historians must
embrace and bring to light other neglected parts of her history as well.
Honoring Motley’s life and career requires no less. As Motley described in her
memoir, “Becoming a part of history is a special experience, reserved for only a few.
It’s like earning a law degree or a Ph.D.; nobody can take it away from you. You
may be forgotten, but it’s like immortality: You will always be there.”409 Constance
Baker Motley has doubtlessly “earned her immortality,” and she “will always be
there.”410 But fully appreciating her legacy demands that neither Motley nor her
work addressing housing inequality in Clarke Terrace and other forms of
discrimination in lawsuits filed across the country are “forgotten.”411
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